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This paper compares the ex ante simulation of the impacts of conditional cash transfer programs against the ex post estimates of impacts obtained from experimental evaluations. Using data on program-eligible households in treatment areas from the same baseline surveys that are used for experimental evaluations of conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico and Ecuador, the authors use a micro-simulation model to derive ex ante estimates of the impact of the programs on enrollment rates and This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at eskoufias@worldbank.org.
poverty. The estimates reveal that ex ante predictions of certain impacts of conditional cash transfer programs match up well against the benchmark estimates of ex post experimental studies. The findings seem to support the use of this model to assess the potential impact and cost efficiency of a conditional cash transfer program ex ante, in order to inform decisions about how the program would be designed.
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I. Introduction
Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) have been used by many governments in their attempts to reduce poverty and inequality and achieve longer term human development. CCTs are typically intended to generate incentives among the poor to improve human capital so that they can break free of poverty traps across generations. While CCT programs in different countries may vary in their design and purpose, they tend to share a few basic features. All of them involve transferring resources (usually in the form of cash) to poor households, which are usually provided directly to the mother with reciprocal conditions imposed on the household, to encourage changes in behavioral norms. These conditions commonly include requiring, for example, that children attend school and/or individuals have regular health facility visits. Regardless of the method used, an exclusive reliance on ex post evaluations is also likely to provide little evidence prior to implementation about the potential impact of programs-a question that policymakers are often most interested in, while designing large programs or reforms. Often, the design and implementation of large income transfer programs cannot be delayed till a series of pilots "testing" various design elements have been completed and evaluated using ex post techniques. In other cases, even when the pilot(s) have been tested and evaluated, concerns about "external validity" imply that the policymaker cannot be sure whether a program implemented on a much larger scale than the pilot would have similar impacts or lack thereof. Moreover, policymakers are often interested in questions like the sensitivity of outcomes to amounts of transfers, the differences between the impacts of conditional and unconditional transfers, or the efficiency and effectiveness of alternative program designs. While testing alternative program designs is possible in theory using ex post methods, the complications that arise in implementing and evaluating the relative impacts of multiple "treatments" make such evaluations extremely difficult in practice.
Ex ante evaluations involve simulating the effects of a program on the basis of a household model, in most cases using a data set representative of all program beneficiaries. Such techniques, while having the disadvantage of not measuring the actual impacts of a program, can be particularly useful in addressing some of the questions mentioned above. At the same time these techniques, which rely on structural models of economic behavior, are often criticized about the strong underlying assumptions that are necessary. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) (henceforth BFL) propose such a behavioral model that allows policymakers to evaluate the potential effect of a CCT on poverty, inequality and school enrollment rates. The model combines arithmetic methods with models of demand for schooling, generating predictions about the potential occupational choice (one of which is the decision of going to school) of a child living in a region where a CCT is implemented. The BFL model generates estimates of likely effects of a monetary transfer program, comparing the simulated occupational choice of children with the status quo (absence of the CCT), keeping everything else constant.
The evaluation literature in most part considers ex ante and ex post methods as competing or substitute methods. Ravallion (2008) underscores that the two approaches can instead be complementary -combining an ex post evaluation with an ex ante structural model of schooling 4 choices would allow policymakers to expand the existing set of policy alternatives in considering the optimal design of a given program. While this is true in principle, in order for the two approaches to complement each other in the context of a specific program, the consistency of the results produced by the two approaches would be an important consideration. The concerns about the validity of assumptions that underlie the ex ante behavioral models make it all the more important that their predictions are checked for consistency with the results of ex post experimental evaluations. Any evidence to suggest that ex ante approaches yield results that are at least broadly consistent with those from methodologically sound experimental evaluations would strengthen the case for using such approaches to complement ex post evaluations of similar programs in future, where the relative ease of employing ex ante approaches can be particularly useful in evaluating alternative design options before a program is implemented.
Our paper represents an attempt to generate evidence on the consistency between the two approaches in the context of CCT programs by comparing ex ante predictions with results of ex post experimental evaluations, following the suggestion of Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003) .
Specifically, we compare the school enrollment, poverty and inequality impacts of a CCT program generated ex ante, using the behavioral model suggested by BFL, with the corresponding impacts estimated ex post from a randomized experiment involving the same program. The exercise is conducted for a number of CCT programs, of which the results of two exercises are presented in detail.
The comparison presented in this paper is a validation test of the strongest hypothesis of the BFL model: that the cross-sectional income effects estimated ex ante with a representative household sample would coincide with the ex post estimates of income effects generated by the program. The ex ante simulation of the impact of CCTs on enrolment rate and poverty is conducted using the same baseline surveys that are used for the experimental evaluations of PROGRESA in Mexico and Bono de Desarrollo Humano (henceforth BDH) in Ecuador. The full set of ex ante predictions are then compared with the highly credible and accepted ex post results presented in Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2000) for PROGRESA and Schady and Araújo (2008) for BDH. The choice of these programs for the exercise is partly to do with the fact that they represent large and well-known CCT programs that contain many of the typical features of such programs. Equally important for our purposes is that for both these programs, the randomization of program implementation allowed researchers to conduct 5 methodologically sound experimental evaluations. As a result, the results of these evaluations provide an appropriate benchmark against which ex ante predictions using the BFL model can be compared. The use of the baseline data from these evaluations to generate the ex ante predictions ensures that the ex ante simulations are based on the very same household sample on which the program impacts are estimated ex post.
Section II below reviews the literature most relevant to our analysis. Section III provides a synopsis of the BFL model, including its underlying assumptions and how it works. Section IV discusses the two CCT programs on which the BFL model will be applied (PROGRESA and BDH), the data to be used for the analysis and the ex post evaluation studies that provide benchmark results. Section V presents the results of the comparison between the predictions of the BFL model and results of ex post evaluations. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Review of the Literature
Our review of relevant literature consists of two related parts. Given the topic of our paper, it is important to discuss earlier work done by a number of researchers comparing results from ex ante models and ex post evaluations. Since we use results from experimental ex post evaluations as the yardstick to test the validity of ex ante predictions, it is also important to look back at some of the seminal literature, going back to a few decades, concerned with the predictive power of non-experimental estimators against the benchmark of experimental evaluation results.
The act of forecasting outcomes is frequently subject to criticism, as it relies on estimation of parameters that are sensitive to model specification and to non-observable errors. Forecasts about the impacts of social programs are typically validated by comparing results with the estimated treatment effects from randomized experiments when they are available. Examples of such analyses include Wolpin (2004, 2006) , Attanasio et al (2002) and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) for the Mexican case and Lise et al (2003) for the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP). 2 2 The SSP is a social program providing time-limited earnings supplements to Income Assistance recipients who are able to obtain full time employment within a 12 month period. 6 Todd and Wolpin (2006) use an ex ante model to generate child schooling estimates that compare reasonably well with experimental results. For children aged 12-15 years, the model predicts the effects of PROGRESA on school enrollments to be in the same direction as experimental results, but underestimates them by 21-25 percent. However, when the sample is disaggregated into age groups of 12-13 years and 14-15 years, the results compare less well, particularly among boys. The ex ante model does not predict any change in outcomes for boys aged 12-13 years and significantly overestimates the effects of the program for the 14-15 years age group. Todd and Wolpin also use a particular sample that is not comparable with the one used by Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2000) to generate ex post results. They restrict their sample of analysis from the original 24,077 households surveyed under PROGRESA to only landless households where the spouse of the household head is a woman under 50 years of age, reducing their data sample to 3,401 households (and then by 209 more due to data problems). Attanasio et al (2005) present a complex model to simulate ex ante the likely effects of PROGRESA, as well as that of a hypothetical program that differs from PROGRESA in the way the transfers vary by the grade attended by the child. They do not compare the results of the first exercise with ex post results and instead only present the ex ante program impacts for different age groups. According to our computations using their estimates, the change in enrollment due to PROGRESA predicted by their model translates to enrollment increases of approximately 2 and 5.4 percent among children of age 10-13 years and 14-17 years respectively.
3 In comparison, the enrollment increases attributed to PROGRESA -as estimated by the ex post evaluations of Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2000) -are 2.4 and 7.5 percent for children of age 10-13 years and 14-17 years, respectively. The Attanasio et al model is thus able to generate predictions that match up quite well with ex post evaluation results, even as its complexity and challenges of implementation are considerable.
4 Leite (2007) applies the BFL model to data from PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) 1999 in Brazil to forecast an increase of 3.9 percent in the enrollment rate of poor 3 Our computations involve extrapolating from the enrollment difference presented in Figure 1 of Attanasio et al (2005) , by assigning weights to each age group in Figure 1 and using the baseline survey. 4 These authors also propose the use of a structural model to analyze issues that remain unexplored by standard Difference-in-Difference (henceforth DID) estimators. For example, they estimate that the performance of PROGRESA could have been improved by offering more resources to older age cohorts of children such as secondary school students and less to younger age cohorts or primary school students. An earlier body of literature, including LaLonde (1986), Heckman and Hotz (1989) and others, use experimental results as benchmarks for evaluating the predictive power of partial equilibrium non-experimental estimators, mainly in the context of labor market programs.
These papers concluded that non-experimental methods were not effective in evaluating program impacts. In more recent literature, propensity score matching was extended with 5 Lise et al's calibrated search-matching model incorporates three segments of the market: employed individuals, unemployed individuals receiving unemployment benefits, and individuals receiving income supplements through IA. The model expands on Davidson and Woodbury (1993) 's equilibrium search model by assuming that expected lifetime income is maximized by individuals when they choose their employment state and the intensity with which they seek work if unemployed. 6 For further details, please see Lise, Seitz and Smith (2003) 8 kernel and local linear matching estimators, which use multiple nonparticipants to estimate the outcomes of the control group as opposed to pair-wise estimation. This method, used by Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) , was implemented with longitudinal and crosssectional data from the National Supported Work Demonstration, another labor market program. 7 The results suggest that such estimators are able to replicate experimental results only when the data examined are very similar -from the same source(s), with treatment and control groups from the same geographic labor markets, and incorporating a range of variables that influence both participation and labor market outcomes. and non-experimental methods in analyzing the income gains from migration, using a survey on the quota of Tongans allowed to immigrate to New Zealand each year on the basis of a lottery from an excess number of applicants. They generate experimental estimates of income gain from migration by comparing gains of applicants whose names were not drawn in the lottery with those who immigrated through the lottery, after taking into account those who did not immigrate even after they "won" the lottery. They also survey a non-applicant group and generate non-experimental estimates for comparison with the experimental estimates. Because migrants are more likely to have certain observable and unobservable characteristics (such as ability and drive), the non-experimental methods are shown to overstate income gains from migration by between 9 and 82 percent.
The ex ante labor market models described here suggest the difficulties in predicting the impacts of a program using a model representing standard economic incentives incorporated through wages. In our paper, however, the effects of programs are simulated using a model incorporating household income, where the incentives operate through channels that are quite different.
7 NSW was a subsidized work experience program providing recipients with training and assistance in finding regular jobs. 8 Summarized from Smith and Todd (2006 This section presents a summary description of the BFL model, used as the ex ante evaluation tool in this paper (a more detailed discussion of the model can be found in the original BFL paper). Rather than constructing a complete structural model of demand for schooling and intra-household labor allocation, the BFL model aims to obtain reasonable orders of magnitude for the likely effects of cash transfers that are conditional on school attendance. The structural aspects of modeling are thus kept to the minimum necessary to capture the main effects of the program. There are four key underlying assumptions. Firstly, occupational choice is assumed to reflect (in reduced form) the end result of whatever decision-making process about a child's time allocation unfolds in a household, regardless of how the decision is made. Secondly, the decision to send a child to school is assumed to be made after all occupational decisions by adults within the household have been made, so that the schooling decision does not affect those earlier decisions. Thirdly, the model does not allow for decisions about the occupational choice of multiple siblings in a household to be made simultaneously or jointly. Fourthly, the composition of the household is taken as exogenous. While each of these assumptions is an abstraction from reality (at least for some households), they make for a simple, reduced-form approach that is tractable with the baseline data available for most programs.
Let j =0 be the occupational category of "not attending school," j =1 be that of "attending school and working," and j =2 be that of "attending school only." Following the approach adopted in BFL, the utility function of child i corresponding to each occupational category j is given by the following:
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Where Z i are the characteristics of both the child and the household, Y -i is the household income without the child's earnings, y ij is the child's income earned in alternative j; and v ij is the random variable representing idiosyncratic preferences. γ j and α j are parameters specific to occupational category j. The model is parsimonious in its representation of occupational choice of children and allows for all possible trade-offs between current income of the household and the schooling of the child. 11 A key variable is the child's earning y ij since transfers depend on household income and the schooling/occupational status of a child, which in itself affects the child's earning.
The model implicitly treats the child's number of hours of work as a discrete choice between 3 alternatives, corresponding to the 3 occupational categories given by j. It seems reasonable to define child i's earning in occupational category 0 as equal to her observed market earnings denoted by w i , since no time is spent on schooling. Assuming that earnings can be characterized by the standard Becker-Mincer human capital model, w i is given by:
Where X i is a set of individual characteristics (including age and schooling achieved) and u i is a random term that stands for unobserved determinants of earnings. The second term on the right hand side is a dummy variable representing the fact that a child who attends school and 10 See equation (2) in the BFL paper, which in turn is the linearized version of a more general specification given by equation (1) in their paper.
11 Note that the model can also implicitly represent a trade-off between current income of the household and future income of the child (and perhaps the household as well), since schooling would be expected to raise his/her future income 11 works for wages has less time available and is therefore likely to earn less. The child's contribution to the household income (y ij ,) in the various alternative categories for j is given by:
Where y ij covers income from both market-based and domestic work done by child i in occupational category j. Being in category 1, namely attending school while working outside the household, leads to a reduction in total income (relative to income in category 0) by the proportion (1-M). Similarly, going to school without working in the market leads to a reduction in total income by the proportion (1-D). 12 While D is not observed, M is assumed to be the same for domestic and market work and can be estimated from observed earnings represented by equation (2) above. Replacing (3) in equation (1): Child i (or the household of child i) will choose the occupational category j that yields the highest utility among the 3 alternatives. Assuming that all parameters of equation (2) Equation (6) adds a transfer amount T to the part of household income that is independent of the child's income, conditional on the child going to school. Thus in maximizing the utility function given by (6), the household must take into account the fact that it will receive T only in states (j=1) or (j=2). Under the assumptions made earlier, equation (6) 
Estimation of discrete choice model
An assumption that the v ij are independently and identically distributed across sample observations with a double exponential distribution leads to the well-known multinomial logit model, which can be used to estimate equation (6), where j=0, 1, 2 are the three alternative categories of occupation the household can choose between. The estimation of parameters is complicated by the nature of the model, which only allows the coefficients corresponding to a given category to be estimated as a deviation from those of a reference category. To see this,
we start by noting that the probability a child/household i will select occupational choice k is given by:
Taking (j = 0) as the reference state or occupation category, (7) can be written as:
Multinomial logit estimation permits the estimation of only the differences (α j -α 0 ), (β j -β 0 ), and (γ j -γ 0 ) for j = 1, 2. Since the transfer is conditional on the child being in state 1 or 2, the income variable is asymmetric across alternatives. Thus in order to find the utility maximizing alternative (k * ), it is necessary to find estimates of the coefficients α 0 , α 1 and α 2 , for which the structural assumptions listed in equation (4) are useful.
Let and be the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model corresponding to the income and the child earning variables for alternatives (j = 1) and (j= 2), the alternative (j=0) being taken as the reference. Using equation (4) we get the following system of equations : 13 13 To obtain (9), recall from (4) that: and that: for j=1, 2.
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Which is equivalent to Using (9a), we can derive estimates of α 0 , α 1 , α 2 and D from the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit and M; where M is obtained from the estimation of equation (2). In estimating the residual terms (v ij -v i0 ), it is important to recall that these cannot be observed in a discrete choice model, and can instead only be known to belong to certain intervals. Thus the residual term for each child is drawn from the relevant interval, which is to say, in a way consistent with that child's observed choice of occupational category.
14 Finally, we note that equation (6) is not easily estimated without variable w i , which is unobservable for children who are not in the labor market. The most rigorous approach would be to estimate the discrete choice model and the earning equation simultaneously by maximum likelihood techniques -a cumbersome procedure. 15 Correcting the estimation of the earning function for a selection bias turns out to be problematic as well (see discussion in BFL).
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Instead, the BFL model uses a simple approach, which has the advantage of transparency and robustness. This consists of estimating equation (2) by OLS, which is then used to predict the potential wage w i for children who are not in the labor market. A random term u i is added to the predicted earning of each non-working child to account for unobserved heterogeneity, by drawing from the distribution generated by the residuals of the OLS.
Simulating the impacts of a CCT program
Using the estimation steps described above, the outcomes of a given CCT program can be simulated with equations (5) and (6), but with the additional step of introducing a "means test" to identify eligible beneficiaries, which is a feature in CCT programs like PROGRESA and BDH. 14 For instance if child i has chosen state or category 1, the terms (v ij -v i0 ) must be drawn so as to satisfy the inequality: . 15 To handle simultaneously the random terms of the discrete choice model and that of the earning equation, a multinomial probit would then be preferable to a multinomial logit. This would then however pose the difficult challenge of integrating tri-variate normal distributions. 16 Proper identification using the inverse Mill's ratio to correct the earnings equation for election bias requires variables/instruments which influence earnings but not the occupational/schooling choice of children.) Such variables are not readily available from the data. Moreover, the standard correction using a two stage procedure is even weaker in the case of more than two choices.
14 The means test is represented by assuming that the transfer T is provided only if household income is less than or equal to a pre-determined threshold Y 0 . Taking into account both the means-test and the conditionality of child attending school, child (household) i would choose the state or occupational category that yields the maximum utility among the following alternatives:
As explained earlier, the estimation of the multinomial logit regression, combined with the relationships shown in (9a), allows us to simulate the utility maximizing decision for household i to choose among the alternatives specified in (10). It is easy to see that the introduction of a transfer can induce households to move from occupational category 0 (no schooling) to category 1 or 2, and also from 1 to 2 if it were the case that the household qualifies for the transfer only when the child went to school and stopped working.
The framework in (10) can be used to simulate the impacts of a variety of CCT programs that are conditional upon schooling enrollment, allowing for both the means test and transfer to be dependent on individual or household characteristics (e.g. transfer amount varying according to age or gender of the child). That said, important caveats or limitations apply to this framework, which are closely related to the assumptions set out at the beginning of this section. Firstly, the model cannot account for the effects of any upper limit on transfers going to a single household, which is a direct result of the model ignoring the possibility that decisions affecting multiple children in a household may be made simultaneously. Secondly, household income excluding the earnings of the child is treated as exogenous. This does not take into account for the possibility of the means test affecting adult labor supply -for example, when an adult decides to not participate in the labor market if the extra income makes the household ineligible for the CCT program. While this can be a serious issue when eligibility is defined by actual (or observed) income, it is less so when eligibility is defined by a score-based "proxy" means test that attempts to reflect permanent income.
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IV. Programs and Data Description
PROGRESA was launched in Mexico at a time when economic growth was found to be insufficiently pro-poor and existing safety net programs were seen as ineffective (Coady, 2004) .
PROGRESA was designed to alleviate poverty in both the short and long run, by making monetary transfers to poor families while requiring that they invest in the human capital of their children. Renamed Opportunidades in 2003, PROGRESA provides monetary grants to selected families (and usually to the mothers) conditional on children being enrolled in and regularly attending school, and on all family members attending scheduled visits to health care centers.
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The educational grant is provided for each poor child under the age of 18 years and enrolled in school between the 3 rd grade of primary and 3 rd grade of secondary level. The grant amount is adjusted every six months for inflation and varies by school grade and gender, increasing as children progress to higher grades (see Appendix, Table A-1). The grant is intended to reverse two observed tendencies among poor Mexican communities: older children are more likely to work, which implies that the opportunity cost of going to school increases with the grade level, and girls have higher dropout rates than boys at the secondary level. The health and nutrition grants components are intended to improve health indicators through regular visits to health care centers for all family members and enhance food consumption through nutritional supplements, especially for children under the age of 2 years and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
19
17 Typically the proxy means test score is determined by factors such as ownership of durable goods and assets like land, housing conditions, education and occupational status of household members, and demographic characteristics like number of children and dependency ratio -none of which are directly influenced by the decision of an adult member to participate in the labor market.
PROGRESA was first implemented during the first half of 1998 in 320 randomly assigned rural transfer cash to poor households, the transfers are also intended to be conditional on child enrollment and health care center visits. In its early days, compliance with the conditions was not monitored and consequently, non-complying households were not penalized. In order to 20 These villages were randomly selected out of 6,396 villages (4,546 considered to be in the treatment group and 1,850 in the control group) using probability proportional to size. Villages were identified on the basis of a community score based on information available from national census data regarding characteristics such as educational levels, occupational composition, and housing conditions. 21 Further details are available in Skoufias and Parker (2001) . 22 The 7 states were: Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Veracruz. According to Schady and Araújo (2008) , around 27 percent of households in both treatment and control groups had stated that school attendance was a prerequisite for receiving BDH grants, despite the fact that the program administrator had never enforced any conditions. BDH was found to have a positive impact on school enrollment and a negative impact on child work; the 18 fact that households believed school attendance to be mandatory may explain the scale of these program effects.
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V. Comparison between Ex Ante and Ex Post Estimates of Program Impact 26
The BFL model as described in Section III can be used to simulate school enrolment (and labor participation of children) in the presence of the CCT program, which can then be compared with the outcomes for the counterfactual -namely, the observed scenario in the absence of CCT.
When the simulation is conducted with the treatment group -a sub-sample of the full baseline survey sample -the impact obtained may be considered as an estimate of the "Average Intent to Treat" (henceforth AIT) because it simulates the impact of the CCT program on the enrollment rate among all eligible children, regardless of whether they accept the transfer or not. Even if a child is eligible to receive the transfer, if the amount of transfer is insufficient to move him/her from category 0 to 1 or 2, the household would not accept the transfer and consequently, the transfer is not allocated to the household in the simulation.
27
The AIT estimator is then given by:
Where P * is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if children would be enrolled in school after receiving transfer T and P is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if children are currently enrolled in school. AIT* provides an estimate of the average impact of the availability of the program to eligible households in treatment communities. The selected sample comprises only children who were of age 8-17 years at the time of the baseline survey in 1997. Given how the BFL model is set up, the data from the follow-up survey on the same children, which is to say the panel data, is not utilized for the simulation. Out of the 33,609 children in the baseline sample the simulation was applied to, around 30 percent were not attending school, while only around 4 percent of children were combining work outside the household with school. Children not attending school were on the average older and with higher education level than those who were in school and not working. Households with higher dropout rates were not necessarily poorer, indicating the importance of child income for the household. Child earnings increased with age and girls were more likely to drop out than boys, but boys were more likely to work and attend school simultaneously (see Appendix, Table A-2 for all descriptive statistics). Average household size was similar (around 7 members) for the 3 groups of children and more educated parents were more likely to have children in school.
Enrollment patterns across age groups are important to note as well, with implications for how program impacts should be estimated. Dropout rates increase sharply around the age when children are expected to complete primary schooling, rising from 7 percent at age 11 to nearly 20 17 percent at age 12 and increasing exponentially thereafter to reach nearly 82 percent at age of 17. Because of the vast differences in enrollment across age groups, Skoufias and Parker suggest that the sample of children aged 8 to 17 years must be divided into two groups in assessing the potential impact of the program: children of primary school age (8-11 years) and those of secondary school age (12-17 years).
The experimental design of PROGRESA ensures in theory that all possible sources of bias were evenly distributed among participants and non-participants, allowing us to strictly attribute differences between treatment and control groups to program effect. 28 However, different papers have analyzed the pre-program composition and characteristics of treatment and control groups in detail, suspecting that despite randomization the two groups were not fully comparable. Skoufias and Parker also find some evidence of systematic differences between the two groups and propose that a double-difference (DID) estimator, which takes into account any pre-existing differences, is preferable in evaluating the impacts of PROGRESA.
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To be consistent with the Skoufias and Parker's methodology for ex post evaluation, the BFL model is estimated (see appendix for model specification and estimations) for all boys and girls aged 8-17 years in the baseline sample, and the results are presented separately for three age groups and gender categories. This generates results for six age-gender categories.
Following the argument at the beginning of this section, the ex ante AIT estimator generated by the BFL model (see (11) above) can be compared directly with the ex post results from Skoufias and Parker (Tables 5 and 6 ), who use the sample of all eligible households and measure the direct effect of the "intent to treat", regardless of whether they in fact received a transfer or not. The ex post AIT estimates should be seen as a lower bound of the impact on households that actually received treatment, since the observed impact also includes the effect of flaws in program targeting, which would dilute the impact on eligible households (for example, when mis-targeting results in an eligible household being left out of the program). These estimates are derived from a regression-based approach that yields the DID estimate of the program's impact in each round (of the follow-up surveys), which is net of any preprogram differences between treatment and control households and any time trends in the values of the outcome indicator. Figures 4a and 4b of their paper) show that the mean school attendance rate of both boys and girls were nearly identical for control and treatment villages at the outset of the program. For treatment villages, the enrollment rate among boys was higher than that of girls in the baseline year, where the difference is entirely a result of the higher dropout rate among girls of age 12-17 years (Table 1 ). For the age group 8-11 years, enrollment was high at around 94 percent for both boys and girls. Table 1 shows the AIT estimates of impact of PROGRESA on school enrollment rates by age and gender (Skoufias and Parker, henceforth SP) as well as the ex ante AIT estimates using the BFL simulation model. Ex ante estimates are also shown for a hypothetical case where the transfer is 22 unconditional, namely provided to all potential beneficiaries, regardless of whether they are enrolled in school or not. The ex ante AIT (conditional) estimates compare quite well with the ex post estimates. Both types of estimates show the impact of PROGRESA on enrollment to be much higher among children of age 12-17 years than children of age 8-11 years, and higher among girls than boys in the 12-17 age group. While the ex ante and ex post estimates are almost identical for boys of age 12-17 and girls of age 8-11, the ex ante estimates understate the impact for girls of age 12-17 and boys of age 8-11. Boys of age 8-11 years are the only group for which the two types of estimates disagree on whether there is any significant impact or notthe ex post estimate show a small positive impact while the ex ante estimate is not different from zero. The confidence intervals of ex ante and ex post estimates for the same group overlay each other to a large extent. One advantage of ex ante methods is that they allow for the simulation of hypothetical scenarios. In the hypothetical case where transfers are unconditional, the simulated effect on enrollment rate is found to be zero for all age/gender groups. Table 2 shows the results of a similar exercise comparing ex ante and ex post AIT estimates of the impact of transfers on the proportion of children who are working outside home. The ex ante estimates are again quite close to the ex post SP estimates of impact. Both methods indicate that PROGRESA has the impact of reducing the rate of child labor among 12-17 year olds, but not among 8-11 year olds -quite consistent with what was seen in terms of impact of enrollment using both methods. Among the 12-17 year olds, the program's impact on child labor is larger for boys than for girls. For both boys and girls of the 12-17 year age group, the ex ante estimates understate the size of the impact relative to the ex post estimates. Consistent with what was seen for enrollment, the ex ante simulations with unconditional transfers show no impact on child labor, suggesting that the conditionality of the transfer was a crucial factor for the impacts.
Skoufias and Parker (in
While it is encouraging to find that the BFL model has good predictive power when compared to results from ex post evaluations with experimental design, the similarity of results may be driven by the restricted and homogenous nature of the baseline sample (of ENCEL) on which the simulations are run. Moreover, from a practical point of view, a specialized baseline survey of program areas may not be available in all cases to conduct ex ante simulations. CCT programs are often set up quickly responding to political needs or to utilize a brief window of opportunity, which may leave little time for baseline data collection. In such cases, a nationally representative household survey, which has much more heterogeneity across households than any baseline survey, is often the only source of data available to conduct simulations on.
Therefore, for methodological as well as practical reasons, it is useful to test the validity of ex ante predictions from the BFL model using the Mexican National Household Survey (ENIGH). This is done by estimating the key parameters of the BFL model (α j 's, M and D) for all children of age 12-17 years with ENIGH 1996 (the round that was the closest to the launch of PROGRESA), and comparing the estimated parameters with those estimated with a similar model specification for the same age group of children from the ENCEL survey.
The estimated parameters from ENIGH do not differ significantly from those estimated with the baseline survey (Table 3) . For all key parameters, the 95 percent confident interval generated by ENIGH and ENCEL overlap each other and can thus be considered statistically similar. However, 24 ENIGH parameters generate smaller program effects compared to the results in Table 1 because all the parameters are a little smaller in size than ENCEL-generated parameter estimates. These results confirm the findings of Leite (2007) for Brazil, which show that estimations based on a more heterogeneous sample such as the one surveyed in the national representative PNAD leads to smaller parameter estimates. By estimating the same set of parameters for a subsample of homogenous households, Leite (2007) found a much higher impact on the enrollment rate and reduction of child work. The BFL model also makes the estimation of program effects on poverty and inequality possible, which is useful to examine the importance of PROGRESA as an anti-poverty program in the short 30 Leite (2007) estimates the set of parameters of interest using a sub-sample of children around the means test threshold. This is done by defining two homogenous groups -potential beneficiaries who are below the means test threshold (treatment) and non-beneficiaries who are above the threshold (control) -who have made their choices subject to similar income constraints. He finds that 65 percent of the movement of children out of the labor market that were already in school can be explained as a response to the Bolsa Escola. These two groups around the means test threshold, according to the Regression Discontinuity Design, are more likely to have similar observable and unobservable characteristics which would make it a good approximation of a randomized experiment.
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run. This is done by setting 750 pesos as a maximum transfer per household (consistent with the rules of PROGRESA), using the same poverty line as in Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) 31 and taking into account individual level decisions through the BFL model. Table 4 below shows these results. Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008) The final step in our analysis is the simulation of the cost of the program based on the BFL model. Table 5 shows that 4,558 out of 7,110 (or 64 percent of) poor families in treatment villages would enroll in the program and accept the condition of school attendance. The average cash transfer for these families in treatment villages is estimated at 303 pesos/month, which is very close to the average transfer of 300 pesos in January 2002 for 1.6 million families observed from official program data. Based on an analytical exercise of scaling up the cost of the program 31 The poverty line is equivalent to 176.17 pesos per month (for details, see Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008) 32 The ex ante results presented in Table 4 remain the same when the simulations were done without incorporating the conditionality of schooling. This suggests that in terms of meeting the poverty reduction objective of safety net programs, conditionality does not necessarily imply better results. In other words, it suggests that if the main objective of a CCT program is poverty reduction, the transfers are important but the conditions are not -which makes perfect intuitive sense. from the BFL model to the national figure using ENCEL 1997, the total cost of the program is estimated to be around 6.08 billion pesos, which is very close to the actual program cost of 6.06 billion pesos in January 2002 from the official program data (Table 5) . 
The impact of Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH)
As before, we compare the ex ante estimates of program impact from the BFL model with ex post findings from Schady and Araújo (2008) , henceforth SA. For ex ante simulations, we use the baseline survey of BDH collected in Carchi, Imbabura, Cotopaxi and Tungurahaua and described in section IV above, which is also used by SA as the baseline data in analyzing impact. It is relevant to note that by the authors' own admission, the results from SA should be treated with some caution as they are not based entirely on random assignment.
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A summary of descriptive statistics from SA reveals no significant differences between the predefined treated and non-treated samples for a large number of variables (see Appendix, Table   A -3 -first two columns), suggesting that the random design of the experiment in terms of the intended treatment and control groups was successful. 33 However, the match between the intended groups with actual BDH recipients is imperfect -transfers went to about 78 and 42 percent of households in the so-called treatment and control groups, respectively. A comparison between recipients and non-recipients of BDH transfer shows significant differences between the two groups for variables like child enrollment, parental education and household size (Appendix, Table A-3, third and fourth columns). Thus selection into the BDH program appears to be non-random.
In order to avoid misspecification due to bias from the contamination of both treatment and control groups, SA computed the "treatment-on-the-treated" or TT estimator using the Two
Stage Least Square method. The TT estimator suggests that the BDH increased enrollment rates among compliers by 9.7 percent, with the statistic being only weakly significant (i.e. significant at the 10 percent level but not at 5 percent). Notably, around 25 percent of households in the sample believed that compliance with the condition of school attendance was mandatory for receiving the cash transfer (to be called "conditioned households" henceforth), despite the fact that this conditionality was not enforced by BDH administrators. Out of these conditioned households, 55 percent were from treatment and 45 percent from control groups. Following the re-weighting scheme of Hirano et al (2003), SA reported the Difference-in-Difference or DD estimator, adding a dummy variable for "conditioned" and an interaction term of the "conditioned" dummy variable with the treatment group dummy variable.
As previously mentioned, our BFL model estimator is a type of "Intend-to-treat" estimator, ITT.
In this case, it is easy to transform the ex post TT estimator from SA (results from Table 3 in SA) for comparison with our estimator, as follows:
33 Children from the intended treatment and control groups are indistinguishable in the baseline data in terms of their enrollment rate, grade attainment, labor participation, gender, per capita expenditure, assets, parental education and household size,
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Another issue to take into account is the amount of transfer to be allocated to each child. Our BFL model is based on the assumption that the decision to enroll (or not) every child in school is made (by the child or the household) independently, taking into account the transfer amount for the individual child. But the BDH program transfers US$15 per household, independent of the number of enrolled children in the household, which makes the decision of sending or keeping every child in school essentially a household level decision.
On the one hand, if we set $15 as the direct transfer amount, we suppose that each child will add to its utility an amount of $15.α j (for all j= 1, 2), 34 which will lead to an overestimation of the effects of the program. This can then be considered as the upper-bound of the estimated impact of BDH from the BFL model. On the other hand, the BFL model does allow us to construct alternative scenarios about how the $15 is distributed within the household, namely the size of the de facto transfer to every child when there are multiple children in the household. We propose three alternative scenarios. The first scenario is one where the transfer received by each child is equal to $15 divided by the number of children aged 6-17 years in the household, with a minimum of $3 per child. In the second scenario, we set an individual transfer of US$5 because the average number of potential beneficiaries is close to three per household. In the third scenario, the individual transfer is set at $7.5. In order to account for the cost of the program and average size of transfer per household, we enforce the official household maximum of $15 as defined by the BDH program and also compute its impact without any
household maximum. Table 6 at US$15. Allowing for different amounts of transfer per household would increase the average transfer to US$32.33 and the total annual cost would more than double. However, the effect on enrolment rate generated by scenario 1 is unlikely, as a child living with its siblings will never make a decision on program participation based on a US$15 transfer. 34 Refer to Equation (4) earlier.
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The next three proposed scenarios have lower estimated impacts ranging from 5.86 percent to 9 percent; and for all three cases, the ex post ITT estimator falls in the 95 percent confidence interval of the ex ante ITT estimator. For these scenarios, the average transfer per household ranges from US$9.8 to US$15.95, regardless of whether the US$15 ceiling is taken into consideration. As a consequence, the estimated cost of the program never extrapolates to the cost in scenario 1 of US$15 per household. For example, this result suggests that we would have observed higher program effects (without affecting the overall cost of the program) by making individual, smaller transfers of US$7.5 per child, so that the amount of transfer per household ranges from US$7.5 to US$45 depending on the size of the household. 
VI. Conclusion
The results of our paper suggest that ex ante and ex post methods for estimating impacts can effectively complement each other to inform the design and evaluation of social programs. In principle, combining an ex ante simulation exercise using a structural model of schooling choices with an experimental evaluation design would help policymakers to assess the implications of alternative choices for program design, potential impacts and cost implications upfront, and rely on ex post evaluation results to validate and identify the actual impacts of the program. For ex ante models to be used this way, however, their results need to be credible in terms of accuracy or predictive power. Our findings make some progress in this direction. Our results suggest that ex ante predictions of certain impacts of CCT programs using the BFL model match up well with Thus the ex ante method proposed by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) can be a powerful simulation method in designing or reforming CCT programs that aim to improve enrollments.
The built-in advantages of an ex ante approach -in terms of cost, practicality and the stage of 31 the program cycle when it can be done -implies that a model that performs well against the benchmark of "gold-standard" ex post evaluations can be extremely helpful to inform policymakers about program design. One major advantage is that in many cases, such a model can allow for comparison between the likely impacts of alternative ways of designing a program -without the time, cost and logistics involved in setting up multiple pilot experiments to obtain ex post evaluation results. There are important caveats as well to the use of the BFL model, the most important among which is that ex ante analysis cannot incorporate any unanticipated changes that may occur during the process of program implementation, be that in the implementation process or in any other extraneous events (including large shocks) that can affect the behavior of program participants. The ex ante exercise would then need to be followed up with an ex post impact evaluation that is able to capture the actual effect of the program on the outcomes of interest, taking into account all the possible changes in the program and the environment it operates in that could have occurred as it was being implemented. 0.15 0.002 Note: All means refer to baseline values. Standard errors in estimated difference for child-specific variables adjust for within-sibling correlation. **Significant difference at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. The sample is limited to households who had school-aged children in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Sample size is 2876 for all child-specific variables, and 1309 for all householdspecific variables except father's education (n=1227) and mother's education (n=1279). Source: Schady and Araújo (2006) - Table 2 . 
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